Most of what decides a negotiation happens before anyone sits down. By the time a company team and a community delegation face each other across a table, the party that prepared has already shaped the room. It knows what it actually needs, not just what it plans to ask for. It knows what happens if the talks collapse. It has a picture of the other side’s pressures that the other side has not volunteered. The party that walked in cold is now improvising against someone who is not.
This is the least glamorous truth about negotiation and the most reliable. Preparation is not a warm-up for the real event. It is most of the event. That holds for a community facing a mining project and for a company trying to secure land access. It holds harder in the extractive setting than almost anywhere else. The stakes run for decades. The relationships cannot be walked away from. A deal struck on thin preparation tends to unravel in year three, when the terms that nobody thought through collide with reality on the ground. This article is about the preparation that prevents that: mapping interests beneath positions, knowing both sides’ alternatives, reading the real stakes, and seeing the whole field before you engage.
Positions are what people say; interests are what they need
The first move in preparing to negotiate is to separate what a party is demanding from what a party actually needs. Roger Fisher and William Ury named this distinction in “Getting to Yes” in 1981, and forty years of practice have not improved on it. A position is a stated demand: the company wants access to a specific parcel by a specific date, the community wants the project stopped. An interest is the underlying need the position is meant to serve. Positions collide. Interests, more often than people expect, can be reconciled.
Take a community position that a mining project must not proceed. Behind it may sit several distinct interests. A reliable water supply for irrigation and livestock. Protection of a burial ground. Local jobs that keep young people from leaving. A guarantee that the land will be usable after the mine closes. None of those interests requires the project to stop. They require the project to be built and governed differently. A company that hears only the position, “no mine,” concludes there is nothing to talk about. A company that maps the interests underneath finds four separate negotiation tracks, most of which it can address.
The same discipline applies to reading the company. Its position may be a fixed price for land and a fixed timeline. Its interests are more revealing. It needs predictable access so the construction schedule holds. It needs the absence of a blockade that would alarm its lenders, and a reputation clean enough to raise capital for the next project. Once you see those interests, you see your leverage. A community that can credibly offer or withhold predictable access holds something the company needs, and needs early. Doing this work before you engage is what separates a negotiation from a shouting match, and it is the same discipline that underpins any serious community benefit agreement negotiation.
Know your BATNA, and estimate theirs
The single most useful thing you can carry into a negotiation is a clear answer to one question: what do I do if this fails? Fisher and Ury called that answer your BATNA, your Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement. It is not your bottom line and it is not a threat. It is the course of action you will actually take if you walk away with nothing. Your BATNA is the real measure of your power at the table, because no rational party accepts a deal worse than what it can get without one.
Work out yours honestly before you engage. For a community, the alternative to agreement might be litigation, a complaint to the project’s lender, a public campaign, or a blockade. It might just be living with the project on the company’s terms. Each has a cost, a timeline, and a probability of success. A blockade may stop work for a week and invite a police response. A complaint to an Equator Principles bank may take months but can freeze disbursements. Naming these honestly tells you how hard you can push and where you are bluffing. A weak BATNA hidden behind strong language collapses the moment it is tested.
Then estimate the other side’s BATNA, because that is what tells you how hard they can push back. What does the company do if it cannot reach agreement with you? Sometimes its alternative is genuinely strong: another deposit, a government willing to expropriate, time to wait you out. Often it is weaker than it appears. A junior explorer with one asset and investors watching cannot afford a two-year standoff. A company that has already sunk hundreds of millions into a half-built plant has almost no alternative to reaching a deal with the people around it. Franks and colleagues documented in 2014 how community conflict converts into hard business costs through exactly this dynamic: delay and disruption on a project that cannot simply relocate. Reading where the other party’s alternative is weak is reading where your leverage is real.
Read the real stakes on both sides
Interests and alternatives are the mechanics. The stakes are what those mechanics are moving, and in extractive negotiations the stakes are rarely symmetrical. For a company, a contested project is one line in a portfolio. A bad outcome means a write-down, a delayed quarter, an awkward call with lenders. For a community, the same project is the water it drinks, the land it farms, the place its children will or will not be able to live. The company can lose and move on. The community, in most cases, cannot. Preparing well means naming that asymmetry out loud rather than pretending both sides are playing the same game.
Naming it does not mean the community holds all the moral weight and the company none. It means each side should prepare by understanding what the other genuinely stands to lose, because that is where durable agreements are built. A company that treats a sacred site as a routine land parcel will get a fight it did not price in. A community that assumes the company can absorb any demand without consequence will push a project past viability and end up with nothing built and no fund created. Both misreadings come from skipping the work of understanding the other side’s real stakes.
This is also where emotion belongs in the preparation, not as sentiment but as substance. Fisher and Shapiro set out five core concerns that shape every negotiation: appreciation, affiliation, autonomy, status, and role. In extractive settings these are routinely mishandled, often by technical teams trained to treat feelings as noise. A community that feels unheard, excluded from decisions, or treated as an obstacle rather than a party will harden its position regardless of the numbers on offer. A good delegation arrives having thought about how the other side needs to be treated, not only about what it needs to receive. That keeps channels open that a purely transactional approach slams shut. Preparation covers both the ledger and the relationship, because in a decades-long project you are negotiating both at once.
See the whole field before you sit down
Extractive negotiations are almost never two-sided, and preparing as if they are is a common and expensive mistake. The Peruvian practitioner Luis Oré maps the terrain with what he calls the Extractive Game Triangle. At its three points sit the company, the government, and the local community. The government is itself split across national, regional, and local levels that do not always want the same thing, and the community is rarely a single voice. Along each side of that triangle runs an interaction that can be conducted through interests, through rights, or through raw power. Preparing to negotiate means locating every actor on that map and asking, for each, which of those three registers they are currently using.
The value of the map is that it shows you where a negotiation is really being decided. A community may be talking to the company while the outcome actually turns on the regional government’s permit decision. A company may believe it is negotiating with a community when it is really negotiating with a coalition. That coalition can include an NGO, a water-users’ association, and a mayor with an election coming. Oré’s insight, drawing on the classic distinction between interest-based, rights-based, and power-based approaches, is that most extractive relationships default to rights and power. The company enforces its concession through law. The community, when it feels unheard, escalates to protest and blockade. Both are costly, both tend to produce winners and losers, and both corrode the trust a long project depends on.
Oré’s own case study makes the pattern concrete. Southern Peru Copper Corporation moved to expand its Toquepala concentrator in Tacna. The Candarave farmers asked in writing to be heard on the water supply their livestock and crops depended on. The company replied that the province lay outside the project’s official area of influence and declined to negotiate. The conflict escalated through 2011 into blocked roads and clashes at a public hearing. Only after two dialogue tables did the parties reach a January 2013 agreement, including a Development Fund of S/. 255 million over ten years, with S/. 150 million earmarked for water infrastructure. The deal that ended the conflict addressed the interest, water security, that a rights-and-power approach had spent two years failing to resolve. A party that had mapped that field at the start would have seen the interest, and the cost of ignoring it, before the first road was blocked.
Turn preparation into a written plan
Preparation that lives only in someone’s head does not survive a tense meeting. The moment a negotiation heats up, memory narrows and the loudest voice in the room wins. That is why serious negotiators reduce their preparation to writing before they engage. Not talking points, a plan. It records the interests behind your positions, ranked, and your BATNA with the point at which you would rather walk than accept. It records your read of the other side’s interests, alternatives, and pressures. It names the objective standards you will insist on, whether IFC Performance Standards, national resettlement law, or a comparable agreement nearby. And it holds the full map of who else sits on the triangle and what they want.
Writing it down does three things. It forces honesty, because a weak BATNA looks weaker on paper than it sounds in conversation. It builds a shared position within your own team or community, so a company cannot split you by picking off the member who never agreed to the plan. And it gives you a fixed reference when the meeting tries to pull you off course. Watch for the artificial opening deadline, the offer that sounds generous until you check it against your ranked interests, the concession dangled to change the subject. A written plan is what lets you recognize each of these for what it is, rather than reacting in the moment.
Build your preparation before the first meeting
The Pre-Negotiation Preparation Map turns this article into a working instrument you complete before you engage. It is a downloadable checklist of 17 items across five sections. The sections cover separating positions from interests, working out your BATNA and estimating the other side’s, and reading the real stakes and the five core concerns on both sides. The last two map every actor on the Extractive Game Triangle and lock your preparation into a written plan your team can hold to. Each item is scored In place, Partial, or Absent. You see at a glance where your preparation is solid and where a gap will cost you at the table. Any item marked Partial or Absent is a task to close before you convene, not after. A delegation that walks in with this map already filled out negotiates from evidence and a plan, while the other side is still guessing. Download the Pre-Negotiation Preparation Map, complete it as a group, and revisit it before every major session.
Why a structured, mediated process turns preparation into a durable deal
Good preparation can still be wasted if the negotiation itself runs on power and rights rather than interests. A well-prepared community can meet a company determined to enforce its concession. A well-prepared company can meet a community set on a blockade. Either way, both end up in the same costly standoff that swallowed two years at Toquepala. Preparation earns its return when it feeds into a process built to use it. That means an interest-based negotiation, conducted as structured dialogue, with rules both sides agree to. Where the parties cannot hold that discipline alone, an independent mediator keeps it on track. A mediator does not weaken your preparation. A mediator is what stops the stronger party from turning the room back into a contest of leverage, so the interests you mapped actually get addressed.
This is the logic behind the Social Accord Architecture, the field-tested framework I use to help companies and communities build agreements that hold. It begins where this article ends, with disciplined preparation on both sides. It then channels that preparation into a shared process and a common language that runs from the boardroom to the village hall. It is accountable to both parties at once. It protects the community’s livelihoods and the company’s investment, because a deal that serves only one side is the deal that falls apart. Knowing when a negotiation needs that outside help, and when your own team can carry it, is its own judgment call, one I have written about separately in when to call a mediator and when to trust your own team. If you want to pressure-test your preparation before you sit down, reach me at thomas@thomasgaultier.com.