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Host Communities: The Resettlement Party Nobody Consults

Thomas Gaultier 9 min read

Every resettlement has a third party that the plan treats as scenery. The displaced households are counted, valued and consulted, at least in principle. The company is present at every meeting. The host community is the village that will receive the new site. It gets the extra children in its school, the extra cattle on its pasture and the extra buckets at its borehole. It is usually informed rather than consulted, and compensated for nothing. Three years later the project has two communities in conflict with each other and with the company, and cannot understand where the second dispute came from.

The international standard does not permit this. IFC Performance Standard 5 defines a host community in a single line, as any community receiving displaced persons. It then folds hosts into almost every obligation: engagement, grievance access, entitlements in the resettlement plan, respect for existing institutions. Projects read those clauses as applying to the displaced. They apply to both.

This article is about why host communities are the predictable second front of resettlement conflict, and what they actually lose. It is also about how to bring them to the table as a party in their own right rather than as a footnote to someone else’s plan.

What a host community absorbs

Consider a scenario drawn from patterns across many projects rather than any single case. A village of four hundred people sits five kilometres from a new mine. The company needs to move two hundred households from the pit footprint, and the flat land beside the village is the obvious site. The site is built to a good standard: brick houses, a borehole, a new school block. The displaced households move in over six months.

Now count what the host village has absorbed. Its pasture now feeds twice as many animals, on land that was already marginal in the dry season. Its borehole serves the resettlement site too, because the new one has not yet been commissioned or breaks down. The school block was built, but the teachers were not, so class sizes double. The clinic sees twice the patients. Firewood, thatching grass and wild fruit that the village gathered from the land the site now occupies are gone. The chief’s authority is contested by the incoming leaders, who arrived with their own structures and a relationship with the company that the hosts never had. Bride prices, land prices and rents rise. The shopkeeper does well. The herder, the widow who gathered thatching grass and the family at the end of the borehole queue do not. And the resettled households arrived with new houses and compensation money, while the hosts, who lost pasture and gathering land, received nothing.

Cernea’s list of displacement risks reads as well for the receiving community as for the displaced one. Loss of access to common property and social disarticulation are precisely what the host village has just experienced. Nobody moved them. They were displaced in place.

The arithmetic is rarely done because nobody is asked to do it. A resettlement budget has a line for each displaced household and none for the village next door. Yet the host village’s borehole yield, its dry-season grazing and its classroom count are finite numbers, and the project has just doubled the demand on each. Any water engineer could have said in an afternoon that one hand pump cannot serve eight hundred people. The question was never put to one, because the hosts were not in the plan.

Why hosts are left out

Hosts are left out for three reasons, and none of them is malice. First, the census counts people inside the project footprint, and the host village is outside it, so it never enters the eligibility list. Second, the resettlement budget is built around the displaced households, and adding a second community to it looks like scope creep to a project accountant. Third, the company assumes the hosts will benefit: a new school, a borehole, a road, more customers for the shop. Benefits that are real but unevenly distributed, and that do not compensate for what was lost.

The standard anticipates all three. Paragraph 10 requires engagement with affected communities including host communities, using the same stakeholder engagement process required for everyone else. Paragraph 11 requires that the grievance mechanism serve displaced persons and hosts. Paragraph 19 requires the Resettlement Action Plan to establish the entitlements of all categories of affected persons, including host communities. Paragraph 20 requires that the existing social and cultural institutions of the displaced and of any hosts be respected. A plan that treats hosts as beneficiaries with no entitlements and no seat has not met the standard, and a lender’s monitor will say so eventually. The community usually says so first.

The conflicts that follow

Host-resettler conflict has a recognisable sequence. It starts with small resource disputes: cattle in someone’s field, a queue at the borehole, firewood taken from a grove the hosts consider theirs. It moves to institutional friction: which chief settles the cattle dispute, which committee allocates the new school places, whose customary rules govern the land the site sits on. It hardens into identity: the newcomers and the original people, the ones the company favoured and the ones it forgot. By the time it reaches the company as a grievance, it has stopped being about the borehole.

I have watched this sequence from the mediator’s chair more than once. The presenting complaint is a fence or a queue. Under it sits a question of recognition: the hosts want someone to acknowledge that they gave something up and were never asked. Until that is said, the borehole cannot be fixed, because every technical fix is read as another decision made about them without them. The mediation that works starts by putting the host’s loss on the record alongside the resettlers’ loss, and only then turns to water.

The company often makes it worse by design. Compensation visible to the hosts but not shared with them creates a grievance about fairness that no amount of school building removes. A site laid out without reference to the host village’s own settlement pattern, sacred sites or grazing routes signals that the hosts’ knowledge was not wanted. Then there is the grievance mechanism the resettled households were trained to use and the hosts were never told about. It fails the accessibility and legitimacy tests in the UN Guiding Principles for a whole community at once. I described the same failure from the other direction in Land Access and Resettlement Disputes. A process that recognises one group’s loss and not another’s produces conflict between the groups, and then with the company.

Bringing hosts to the table as a party

The correction is structural, not cosmetic. A host community is a party to the resettlement, with its own losses, its own entitlements and its own seat, from site selection onward.

Site selection comes first. Before any land is chosen, the candidate host communities should be consulted about whether they will receive a site at all, on what land, and on what terms. Their answer might be no, and a no heard early is cheaper than a decade of friction. Where the answer is yes, the host’s land, water, grazing and gathering losses should be assessed with the same census method applied to the displaced. They should be compensated on the same basis. The community baseline should be extended to cover the host village before the site is designed, so that carrying capacity for water, pasture and services is known rather than assumed.

Entitlements follow. The resettlement plan should state what the host community receives. That means land-for-land where common property is lost, and infrastructure sized for the combined population and built before arrival. It also means a share in benefit arrangements proportionate to what the hosts gave up. Services are the test most projects fail. A school block without teachers and a borehole without a maintenance arrangement are liabilities transferred to the host village.

Institutions come last and matter most. The plan should agree, with both communities, how disputes between them will be handled and which customary authority governs which questions on the site. It should also settle how the host’s leadership sits in the project’s engagement structures. A joint committee of host and resettled representatives handles most of the friction before it hardens. It should meet on a fixed rhythm, with a company officer present and an independent facilitator when needed. Where a committee like this exists from the start, the cattle dispute stays a cattle dispute. Where it does not, the same dispute becomes a story about who the company favours, and stories like that outlast the cattle.

One more point about timing. Hosts should be inside the resettlement plan before it is disclosed, not added when they complain. A host community that first sees the site drawings at the public disclosure meeting has already learned that it is an afterthought. The joint committee will then spend its first year repairing that impression instead of managing the site.

Screen your resettlement for the second community

Before a site is chosen, and again before households move, run the Host Community Readiness Screen. It is a 15-point checklist in five sections. They cover consulting hosts before site selection, assessing host losses, sizing services for the combined population, host entitlements and benefit sharing, and joint institutions for the two communities. Score each item In place, Partial or Absent. Absents in the first section mean the hosts were informed rather than consulted and the site decision is already a grievance. Absents in the last section mean there is no forum for the disputes that will arrive in the first dry season. Use it with both communities in the room where possible, because the screen is more accurate when the hosts fill it in. Download the Host Community Readiness Screen

Two communities, one process

A resettlement that protects the displaced and impoverishes the hosts has moved the problem five kilometres. The host village’s livelihoods are as real as the resettlers’, and the company’s investment depends on both. The site sits on the hosts’ land and inside the hosts’ politics for the life of the mine. Treating hosts as beneficiaries rather than parties is the shortcut that produces the second dispute.

The way through is a single structured process in which both communities and the company negotiate the terms of the site together. That is how the Social Accord Architecture approaches it. Diagnostic Mapping identifies the host community as a party before the site is chosen, not after the first cattle dispute. Blueprinting writes host entitlements and the joint dispute forum into the agreement. Stewardship keeps the joint committee running until the two communities no longer need an outside hand. Dual accountability applies to three parties here: the company delivers what it committed to both communities, and each community uses the joint forum rather than the fence line. Where the conflict has already formed, an independent mediator can convene both communities and the company on the same terms. That is usually the first time the hosts have been in the room as equals.

One practical step. Before your next site is selected, walk the candidate land with the host community’s leaders. Ask them what they use it for and what they would need to receive two hundred new households. Write the answer into the plan as entitlements, not as goodwill. To design a resettlement process that includes the host community, or to mediate a host-resettler dispute, write to me at thomas@thomasgaultier.com.

I am Thomas Gaultier. I mediate company-community disputes in mining, oil and gas, and energy projects, and I have resolved more than 2,000 claims across Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. More about the work, or tell me what you are dealing with.

If the relationship around a project is under pressure, or heading there, let us talk.

A 30-minute call is enough for me to understand the situation and tell you honestly whether I can help. Active opposition, a social license problem, an FPIC process that needs an independent facilitator, a negotiation a community has to prepare for, or a conflict that is not public yet but will be. It makes no difference which side of the table you are on. No obligation, no generalist pitch.

Every first conversation is confidential.

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